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THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT’S STRUGGLE TO REMAIN RELEVANT 
Chris Cobleigh 
University of Rhode Island 
 
 
“Organized labor.  Say those words and your 
heart sinks.”  So begins Thomas Geoghegan’s 
account of his experience as a labor lawyer in an 
era when organized labor is in decline.  
Geoghegan portrays labor’s struggle to regain a 
prominent place in American society as a noble 
cause, one worth fighting for, but sees the window 
of opportunity closing.  Indeed, he predicts, “One 
day I will wake up and the unions will be gone, 
completely gone…I look in my open grave and see 
a future of workmen’s comp.  I see old skulls, old 
bones of workers” (Geoghegan 1992: 1).  The 
state of organized labor in America clearly gives 
Geoghegan reason to worry.  When his book was 
published in 1992, the percentage of eligible 
workers represented by unions had dropped 
precipitously from a peak of 32.5 percent in 1953 
to approximately 16 percent.  That figure was 
down from 20-25 percent in 1982, and as 
Geoghegan surveyed the future, he lamented, 
“Maybe it will drop to 12.  Once it drops to 10, it 
might as well keep dropping to zero” (Geoghegan 
1992: 1).  In the intervening 12 years, the overall 
percentage of unionized employees has dropped to 
13.5 percent, and in the private sector, the 
percentage has shrunk to 9 percent. (Wheeler 
2002: xiii). 
What has caused such a monumental decline?  
There is widespread agreement that the causes 
have been both external and internal.  Externally, 
there has been a fundamental shift in the American 
economy from manufacturing to service-based 
jobs.  Since labor has heretofore achieved its most 
significant gains by organizing production 
workers, it appears to be having difficulty 
transitioning to large-scale, service sector 
organization.  Globalization has made capital more 
mobile, thus allowing employers to transfer high 
wage American jobs to countries with lower wage 
rates and fewer government regulations.  The 
political environment has increasingly favored 
capital, so that labor laws originally designed to 
protect labor against the excesses of capital have 
been gradually amended to impede the right of 
workers to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining.  Consequently, some workers believe 
they stand a better chance of achieving gains in the 
workplace by means of individual negotiation with 
their employers rather than collective bargaining.  
It is argued that this is because workers have lost 
confidence in the ability of unions to secure 
workplace gains and/ or because employers have 
made efforts to accommodate workers’ needs in an 
effort to avoid unionization. (Yates 1998: 135-
137). 
The internal causes of labor’s decline are said 
to relate primarily to its willingness to enter into a 
cooperative relationship with capital in the years 
following World War II.  In an effort to establish 
labor peace during that period, corporate leaders 
agreed to recognize the legitimacy of labor and 
bargain in good faith over key issues such as 
wages and hours.  For its part, labor agreed not to 
interfere with management prerogatives, thus 
giving it relative autonomy in day-to-day business 
operations, and to refrain from striking during the 
life of the collective bargaining agreement.  This 
so called “corporate agenda” enabled unions to 
achieve substantial gains for their members in 
terms of core issues such as wages, hours, and 
fringe benefits, but it forced them to abandon the 
wider mission which had been the root of their 
success in the first place.  Instead of continuing to 
push for widespread social reforms that would 
strengthen the rights of all workers, unions 
focused on servicing their own members’ interests.  
This led them to abandon their efforts to organize 
new members and created union bureaucracies 
dedicated to maintaining the status quo.  The 
leaders of these bureaucracies became politically 
powerful and began to distrust those within the 
labor movement who sought to disrupt the balance 
of power established between labor, management, 
and government.  Labor was no longer sure it 
wanted an active rank and file advocating strikes 
and other forms of direct action.  Whereas 
economic action had been a key component of 
labor’s success during the first half of the 
twentieth century, such ideas were suddenly seen 
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as too radical and potentially harmful to the gains 
labor had won for its members. 
For nearly a quarter century following World 
War II, the compromise between labor and 
management produced positive economic results.  
The higher wages gained by workers produced a 
burgeoning middle class, and the resulting 
increase in economic consumption lead to a 
corresponding increase in production.  When the 
post-war economic boom ended (as a result of 
overproduction and increasing global 
competition), capital began to look for a way to 
offset falling profits.  It attempted to cut the wages 
and benefits it had freely given workers as part of 
the so called “labor-management accord” and 
initiated campaigns to impede new unionization 
efforts and destroy existing unions.  Having 
developed cumbersome bureaucracies fully 
committed to “service unionism”, labor was ill-
equipped to respond to capital’s retreat from the 
accord.  Its ineffectiveness in opposing capital’s 
anti-union campaigns eventually lead workers to 
believe they might be better off negotiating with 
their employers individually.  Thus, it is suggested 
that the shift in labor’s internal organization from 
being an engine for social change to being an anti-
democratic bureaucracy has been a key factor in 
its decline (Yates: p.135-143). 
In light of these developments, there has been 
widespread debate concerning the future of 
organized labor in America.  Like Geoghegan, 
many are resigned to labor’s extinction.  Labor 
scholars have begun to ascribe to the theory long 
espoused by the business community that the rise 
of organized labor was a necessary response to the 
excesses of the industrial age, that it was highly 
successful in establishing basic workplace rights 
and raising the standard of living for millions of 
working class Americans, but that it has become 
obsolete in an era where individualism and a 
global economy rule the day.  Others assert that 
labor has historically experienced periods of 
decline but has always been able to revive itself 
when economic conditions force workers to 
consider the merits of collective action.  The 
optimists argue that as long as the employer-
employee relationship exists, employees will be 
compelled to keep their employers in check 
through some form of collective action; they will 
never abandon unionism entirely because the 
alternative would be complete employer 
dominance.  Which of these views is correct?  
Have unions in America become obsolete?  Have 
they lost their ability to represent workers’ 
interests in a meaningful way in the current 
political and economic environment?  What, if 
anything, can they do to return workers’ rights to 
the forefront of the American political and social 
agenda?  These questions are the focus of this 
paper.   
In determining whether organized labor is 
capable of adequately representing workers’ 
interests, it will first be useful to try to define 
those interests, both from labor’s perspective and 
from the perspective of workers themselves.  In a 
1994 report entitled, “The New American 
Workplace: A Labor Perspective”, the Executive 
Council of the AFL-CIO presented its view of 
workers’ priorities and the role of organized labor 
in facilitating those priorities: 
“The moment has come for unions to insist 
upon the right of workers to anticipate in shaping 
the work system under which they labor and to 
participate in the decisions that affect their 
working lives.  Unions have an equally important 
role to play in assuring that workplace change 
plants strong roots.  Unions provide a check on 
managers and owners who waver in their 
commitment to the new work order or who seek to 
revert to old ways” (AFL-CIO 1994: 14). 
Clearly, then, the AFL-CIO argues that 
workers want a greater voice in determining the 
terms and conditions of their employment.  It 
further asserts that unions have a vital role to play 
in checking or limiting capital’s ability to 
maximize profit at the expense of workers.  In a 
recent interview, AFL-CIO president John 
Sweeney provided a more detailed explanation of 
labor’s goals for the future, identifying several key 
areas of concern and laying out strategies to deal 
with them.  Concerning the effect of globalization 
on American workers, Sweeney explained: 
“The essence of our fight is to promote the 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles on 
Rights at Work, the International Labor 
Organization standards that include the rights 
to collective bargaining, not to be 
discriminated against in employment, to reject 
child labor, and to refuse forced labor.  Our 
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aim is not to impose our standards on other 
countries, but to make sure that human beings 
are treated as having rights, and have the 
opportunity to join unions if they desire to” 
(Wheeler 2002: 218).  
Commenting on the AFL’s political goals, 
Sweeney noted that labor has helped Democrats 
gains seats in Congress in every election from 
1996 to 2000 and predicted that increasing 
political activism on the part of union members 
would bolster labor’s efforts to achieve electoral 
victories in the future (Wheeler 2002: 217).  At an 
AFL-CIO labor lawyers conference in April of 
2004, Sweeney once again stressed the need to 
mobilize union support for Democratic candidates 
and get out the vote on election day.  He presented 
a ten-point strategy for achieving these goals, 
including: 1. Recruiting key contacts at local and 
worksites, 2. Distributing leaflets at all union 
worksites, 3.  Maximizing contact through union 
publications, 4. Mailing frequent communications 
from local union presidents and other leaders, 5. 
Updating local member lists, 6. Increasing voter 
registration by 10 percent, 7. Conducting a 
massive get-out-the-vote effort, 8. Building rapid 
response networks in the workplace, and 10. 
Linking politics to organizing. (AFL-CIO 2004: 1-
5). 
Finally, Sweeney alluded to what has clearly 
been the centerpiece of his reform agenda since he 
assumed the presidency in 1995: the need to move 
away from the “service and bargaining model” 
(wherein unions focus primarily on servicing the 
needs of their members through the collective 
bargaining process) and toward an intensive effort 
to organize new members.  He noted that if the 
AFL-CIO could achieve its goal of organizing 1 
million new members annually, it would be able to 
“hold its own as a percentage of the workforce.”  
He then noted that it was currently close to 
organizing about half that number, or 500,000 new 
members annually (Wheeler 2002: 218).  
Sweeney’s comments on labor’s objectives are 
significant because they reveal what could be 
viewed as a relatively conservative reform agenda.  
Certainly, Sweeney is not advocating a radical 
departure from the way labor does business or a 
full-scale revolt against corporate America in 
response to decades of union-busting, wage and 
benefit cuts, plant closings, and the more recent 
phenomena of job relocation and outsourcing.  
Given labor’s seemingly limited objectives, it may 
be reasonable to assume that at least some of 
Sweeney’s goals are attainable in the near future.  
For example, it is not hard to imagine imminent 
success in the political arena.  The American 
economy has experienced a recession in the last 
three years accompanied by significant job loss, 
and although recent economic indicators suggest 
that a recovery is in the offing, job creation 
continues to lag behind.  The other key issue in the 
current election season is the ongoing war on 
terror and the occupation of Iraq.  Given the 
American public’s mixed feelings about these 
issues, a political shift is possible.  Where 
Republicans have managed to hold onto their 
political power base since the landmark election of 
1994, it is conceivable that labor’s electoral efforts 
will pay dividends in November 2004. 
It is also reasonable to envision a scenario in 
which the AFL’s efforts to bring the Declaration 
of Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work to 
the attention of employers around the world are 
successful.  Many nations throughout the world 
currently recognize and abide by the five 
principles enunciated in the Declaration, and 
because labor’s stated goal is simply to increase 
awareness of the Declaration (rather than trying to 
enforce it), the goal may be reachable. 
The AFL’s success in meeting its organizing 
goals is less certain.  In order to effectively 
organize 1 million new members annually, labor 
will have to overcome several longstanding 
problems.  It will have to wage a successful public 
relations battle to dispel the notion that American 
unions are too bureaucratic and corrupt, that they 
are, in effect, just another corporation whose 
leaders seek to benefit themselves at the expense 
of their members.  Further, it will have to convince 
workers that it can be a more effective vehicle for 
promoting workers rights and achieving gains in 
the workplace. 
Even assuming that labor can achieve these 
goals, the next question becomes whether they are 
consistent with the needs and desires of workers.  
What do American workers want, as defined by 
the workers themselves?  An extensive survey of 
worker preferences published in 1998 reveals that 
workers want a system of labor-management 
relations somewhat different from the one that 
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now exists.  First, they want a greater ability to 
participate in decisions that affect their lives at 
work; they believe that such participation will 
make them happier as individuals and make the 
organization for which they work for more 
productive and profitable.  They believe that 
worker participation should take several different 
forms.  On some issues, such as sexual harassment 
and general workplace grievances, they prefer 
dealing with their employers individually rather 
than as a group of employees.  On issues such as 
wages, benefits, and health and safety in the 
workplace, they show a preference for collective 
action.  Though about one third of workers believe 
their employers are unsympathetic to their needs 
in the workplace and strongly resist sharing power, 
they nevertheless seek a cooperative relationship 
with their employers.  They believe that 
developing an openly hostile labor-management 
relationship is counterproductive for them as 
individuals and for the enterprise as a whole.  
They further believe that any kind of workplace 
organization will be more successful if it enjoys 
management participation and support.  While 
some express a preference for unionization, others 
prefer some form of labor-management committee 
in which workers and managers make joint 
decisions regarding workplace rules and 
procedures.  Included in such a committee 
structure would be a mechanism for resolving 
workplace disputes through independent 
arbitration rather than management discretion.  
Furthermore, they believe such a committee 
system would better allow them to achieve gains 
in the workplace than additional government 
regulation.  Essentially, then, workers want a 
varied system of participation and representation 
with a more cooperative and equal relationship to 
management, but a majority appear to want it 
without government interference or a union.  In 
other words, they believe they can get what they 
want from their employers without significant help 
from external forces (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 
4-8).  
These statistics appear to validate the view 
held by some commentators that organized labor 
has become obsolete.  Pointing to the fact that 
roughly two thirds of all non-union employees 
would choose not to vote for a union, and citing 
the statistics regarding the desire for less external 
interference, they argue that American workers 
have fully embraced the notion of individualism in 
the workplace.  They assert that the conditions 
which contributed to the meteoric rise of unions in 
the 1930s and 40s have vanished, never to return, 
because workers have more individual bargaining 
power than they did half a century ago and 
employers have learned how to deal with their 
employees in ways that makes unions unnecessary 
(Wheeler 2002: 5).  However, the data collected 
by Freeman and Rogers also clearly shows that 
workers do not feel they have an adequate voice at 
work, do not have faith in management’s 
willingness to share decision-making power, and 
support changing the system by which workplace 
decisions are made.  Those statistics support the 
view that unions are unlikely to become totally 
extinct.  Indeed, many labor analysts suggest that 
“as long as people procure their livelihood by 
working for wages and salaries, they will 
recognize, sooner or later, the futility of appealing 
to their employers as individuals” (Aronowitz 
1998: 7). 
The data indicates that 90 percent of current 
union members are confident in and satisfied with 
their union.  The data further indicates that one 
third of non-union members see the formation of 
the union as a viable option and would vote in 
favor of one (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 69).  An 
additional 12 percent of those who would vote 
against the union cite management opposition as 
their reason for doing so.  Absent such opposition, 
they said they would change their position and 
vote in favor of the union (Freeman and Rogers 
1999: 87).  Combining these numbers, Freeman 
and Rogers estimate that approximately 44 percent 
of all private sector workers would like to be 
represented by a union (Freeman and Rogers 
1999: 89).  And as Aronowitz points out, at least a 
portion of those who currently believe they can get 
what they want from their employers by 
negotiating with them individually are bound to be 
disappointed when they discover their employer’s 
intransigence.  Add to that the fact that not all 
employers will agree to establish labor-
management committees featuring joint decision-
making on key workplace issues, and the 
inevitable conclusion is that at least some portion 
of the American workforce will see the need to 
organize a union in an attempt to force the 
employer to recognize certain basic worker rights.  
If nothing else, the idea that union contracts 
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require the employer to show just cause before it 
fires someone is sufficient reason for workers to 
favor unionization.  Thus, it appears unlikely that 
the basic concept of unionization in accordance 
with the rules set forth in the National Labor 
Relations Act will vanish entirely from the 
American workplace.  However, the larger 
question is whether labor is capable of achieving 
its stated goal of helping workers participate in the 
decisions that affect their working lives and 
provide a check on capital when it oversteps its 
bounds.  I argue that to meet these objectives, 
labor must achieve greater parity with capital; 
however, that will be impossible to do in the 
absence of a dramatic economic collapse similar to 
the Great Depression.  The fundamental principles 
of capitalism are too firmly embedded in the 
American consciousness.  The American people 
will only question the validity of the capitalist 
ideal if it completely collapses.  Therefore, absent 
some sort of cataclysmic economic event, labor 
will most likely be relegated to its familiar role of 
an anti-establishment organization which will have 
only a marginal effect on the operation of 
capitalist principles.  Perhaps the most effective 
way to support this theory is to undertake a brief 
examination of the history of the American labor 
movement. 
Beginning in the latter half of the 19th century, 
several influential labor unions competed with 
each other for the allegiance of the nation’s 
working class and, in so doing, defined the limits 
of American unionism.  In the 1880s, The Knights 
of Labor rose in response to the infusion of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers into a newly 
industrialized workforce.  Rapidly expanding 
markets caused employers to engage in cutthroat 
competition characterized by lower prices and, 
consequently, lower wages.  This downward 
pressure on wages lead unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers, many of whom were newly arrived 
immigrants, to demand a labor organization which 
would address the growing imbalance between 
labor and capital.  The Knights of Labor took up 
their cause. During the same period, the American 
Federation of Labor focused exclusively on 
organizing skilled workers, who had been 
intermittently successful in gaining wage and hour 
concessions from their employers but were not 
organized under a single umbrella.  The AFL 
sought was to harness the power of skilled workers 
to affect significant change in wages, hours and 
terms of employment, but believed that any 
attempt to include the growing class of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers would detract from this 
goal. 
The demise of the Knights of Labor stemmed 
primarily from the fact that their goals were too 
broad and unfocused to wage an effective battle 
against capital.  They sought to educate their 
workers on economics and politics so they would 
be prepared to lead society, and their ultimate goal 
was the formation of worker cooperatives in which 
workers would share ownership of the means of 
production.  The Knights believed that without 
worker cooperatives, organized labor would not be 
able to successfully achieve its goals because it 
would forever be in opposition to the most 
powerful force in American society: capital 
(Wheeler 2002: 98).  The Knights ultimately failed 
because they could not make the idea of worker 
cooperatives a reality.  Attempting to organize and 
educate unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled 
workers was a monumental task.  The AFL 
presented a better alternative for skilled workers 
because they had more bargaining power which 
with they could force employers to grant 
concessions.  And the Knights lack of focus and 
organization made them an easy target for 
employer attacks.  Indeed, one of the key factors 
contributing to their decline was the media’s 
portrayal of the Knights as the primary cause of 
the Haymarket Riot of 1886, in which several 
Chicago police officers were killed.  Though it 
was later discovered that the riot was lead by a 
group of anarchists who had no affiliation with the 
Knights, the press targeted them as the 
perpetrators and succeeded in turning public 
opinion against them.  Ultimately, the Knights’ 
idea of comprehensive social change was defeated 
by forces which favored the proliferation of 
capitalism.  Conversely, the AFL continued to 
grow during this period because they sought to 
work within the capitalist system to achieve gains 
for skilled workers.   
The competition between the Knights and the 
AFL provided an early indication of the extent to 
which labor could affect change in its relations 
with capital.  However, it was the historic political 
shift that occurred in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression that truly defined the limits of labor’s 
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influence.  When Franklin Roosevelt was elected 
to the presidency in 1932, he promised a 
revolutionary economic and political  agenda that 
would lift American out of the Depression.  As 
part of this agenda, he openly challenged big 
business and sought to replace laissez-faire 
economics with a system of government regulation 
that would put a floor on prices and wages and a 
ceiling on hours.  Upon signing the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, Roosevelt proclaimed, 
“No business which depends for existence on 
paying less than living wages to its workers has 
any right to continue in this country.” 
(Lichtenstein 2002: 25).  In 1935, Congress passed 
the National Labor Relations Act, which gave 
workers the right to “form, join or assist labor 
organizations, bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and engage 
in concerted activity for (their)…mutual aid or 
protection.”  It enforced those rights by requiring 
employers to bargain collectively with their 
employees and proscribing employer unfair labor 
practices (Hardin 1992: 28).  The following year, 
during his 1936 re-election campaign, Roosevelt 
continued his assault on corporate America: 
“Organized money are unanimous in their hatred 
for me, and I welcome their hatred.  The forces of 
selfishness and of lust for power have met their 
match” (Lichtenstein 2002: 46).  Such rhetoric 
emboldened organized labor not just to push for 
the usual improvements in wages and hours, but to 
think in terms of much larger social change in 
which “the responsibilities and expectations of 
American citizenship-due process, free speech, the 
right of assembly and petition-would now find 
their place in the factory, the mill, and the office” 
(Licthenstein 2002: 32).  Surveying the newly 
formed political landscape, CIO president John L. 
Lewis confidently challenged capital: “Let him 
who will, be he economic tyrant or sordid 
mercenary, put his strength against this mighty 
upsurge of human sentiment now being 
crystallized in the hearts of thirty million workers 
who clamor for the establishment of industrial 
democracy and for participation in its tangible 
fruits” (Lichtenstein 2002: 32). 
In 1937, the newly formed United Auto 
Workers seized upon the momentum created by 
the New Deal and Roosevelt’s re-election to stage 
a “sit-down” strike at the General Motors 
Corporation in Flint, Michigan.  At the time, GM 
was the largest and most profitable corporation in 
America, with 110 manufacturing plants 
nationwide, a quarter of a million employees, and 
half a million stockholders.  It was, in short, “the 
perfect exemplar of how and why American 
business (was) big” (Lichtenstein 2002: 48).  By 
physically occupying more than a dozen GM 
plants across the nation over a six-week period, 
the strikers were successful in halting production 
and inflicting significant financial damage on the 
corporate giant.  Eventually, GM reached a 
settlement with the UAW in which it agreed to 
recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining 
representative of its employees and negotiate on a 
multiplant basis.  More significantly, workers 
gained the right to complain to management about 
arbitrary supervision and onerous work rules 
without fear of retribution.  The phenomenal 
success of the GM strike created sense of 
optimism and self-confidence among workers 
nationwide, and union membership swelled.  From 
1933 to 1937, American unions recruited 5 million 
new members, 3 million of which joined in the 
several months following the GM strike 
(Lichtenstein 2002: 51). 
Despite the tremendous momentum of the 
labor movement during this period, its growth was 
hampered by internal divisions and the retaliatory 
actions undertaken by capital.  The Congress of 
Industrial Organizations had taken up the cause of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the 
aftermath of the Knights of Labor and aligned 
itself closely with the Roosevelt administration.  
The AFL opposed the CIO’s brand of unionism 
because it believed labor should remain 
independent from government.  It objected to the 
NLRA’s intrusion into labor-management 
relations because it did not believe government 
should have the right to determine the appropriate 
size and makeup of a union’s bargaining unit or 
mandate elections to determine the will of workers 
in that unit (Lichtenstein 2002: 65).  As a result, 
the AFL initially denounced the NLRA as “left 
wing” and actually aligned itself with conservative 
politicians and businessmen in an effort to revise 
the Act.  The AFL also bought into the aggressive 
anti-Communist sentiments of these conservative 
groups, and together they began to attack the CIO 
for including radical communist elements within 
its ranks. 
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Corporate America was understandably 
alarmed by the success of the labor movement and 
sought to neutralize its gains at every turn.  Alfred 
Sloan, president of GM, characterized capital’s 
view of the labor insurgency, saying, “It took 14 
years to rid this country of prohibition.  It is going 
to take a good while to rid the country of the New 
Deal, but sooner or later the ax will fall and we’ll 
get a change.”  The change came in the form of 
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress 
in 1946, followed by the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947.  By banning secondary 
boycotts, establishing the right of workers not to 
join unions (which lead to the enactment of right-
to-work laws and the elimination of closed shop 
and union shop agreements), overturning the 
Norris-Laguardia Act (which restored the courts’ 
authority to issue injunctions to enjoin certain 
types of union activity), and establishing 
procedures through which employers could 
decertify unions which had previously won an 
election, Taft-Hartley was a welcome first step in 
capital’s drive to re-assert its dominance over 
labor.  The fact that labor ultimately failed to 
maintain its position of power despite the 
overwhelming economic and political advantages 
it derived from the Great Depression and the New 
Deal indicates that its chances for revival in the 
current environment are slim. 
In addition to the weight of historical trends, 
there appear to be inconsistencies between the 
traditional structure and function of American 
unions and the workplace organization currently 
preferred by many workers.  Though labor has 
correctly identified the primary complaint of most 
workers (lack of the ability to participate in the 
decisions that affect their working lives), the 
preference of many workers to be able to negotiate 
individually on some issues and collectively on 
others with minimal interference from external 
groups such as government and unions creates an 
obvious conflict.  Many workers simply do not see 
the need for a union as long as they believe some 
alternate form of collective action is possible.  If 
workers believe they can come together informally 
to negotiate with management on certain key 
issues, the alternative of formally establishing a 
union through the NLRB, creating a perpetually 
adversarial relationship with their employers, and 
paying dues to support a collective bargaining 
process in which they have little or no 
involvement is less appealing.  Indeed, workers 
who are skeptical about union representation 
believe, in varying percentages, that collective 
representation is often inferior to handling 
workplace problems on their own, that having a 
union creates too much tension in the company, 
which they don’t like the way unions operate, and 
that unions are too weak to help workers (Freeman 
and Rogers 1999: 86).  As noted earlier, because 
management is bound to resist the idea of ad hoc 
collective bargaining or labor-management 
committees in which decisions are made jointly by 
workers and managers, traditional unionism will 
remain an option for some workers, but its 
incompatibility with many workers’ ideal 
workplace organizational structure may make it a 
second alternative rather than a preference. 
Turning to the goals themselves, it appears 
that labor’s relatively conservative reform agenda 
may be inadequate to address the needs and 
desires of American workers in the current 
economic environment.  Though labor’s list of 
initiatives to protect and strengthen worker’s rights 
is extensive, it may be useful to consider the three 
major goals mentioned by AFL-CIO president 
John Sweeney in his June 2001 interview.  Since it 
formed an alliance with the Democratic Party 
during the Roosevelt Administration, a primary 
goal of labor has been to elect Democrats to state 
and local legislatures as well as Congress and the 
White House.  This has been a particularly urgent 
priority since the onset of labor’s decline in the 
early 1970s because labor has blamed the decline, 
in large part, on the glaring deficiencies in 
American labor law.  As such, labor believes legal 
reform is the key to turning the tide against anti-
union employers and reviving the movement.  A 
brief overview of the NLRA and the procedures 
through which it governs labor-management 
relations will be instructive in understanding 
labor’s complaints about the current state of the 
law. 
In 1935, a progressive Congress passed the 
National Labor Relations Act to enable workers to 
organize and assert their rights against dominant 
employers.  A decade later, a more conservative 
legislature sought to neutralize the effects of the 
NLRA with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.  
Since then, labor has discovered that the 
framework established by these two bills puts 
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workers at a distinct disadvantage in organizing 
workers and resisting management’s efforts to 
divide and conquer them.  
The difficulties begin before an election is 
ever held.  Union organizers will first ask 
employees to sign authorization cards showing 
their support for the union.  If less than a majority 
of employees agree to sign, the union must 
petition the National Labor Relations Board for an 
election to determine whether the union will be 
certified as the employees’ official representative 
for collective bargaining purposes.  If a majority 
sign cards, the employer has the option of 
accepting the union as the employees’ official 
representative without a certification election.  
However, it may also decline to accept the cards as 
proof of employee support and may ask for an 
election.  Employers routinely refuse to 
acknowledge union authorization cards, even if 
100 percent of the employees sign, because they 
are able to delay union certification by contesting 
the legitimacy of employee support for the union 
(AFL-CIO 2004: Employee Free Choice Act).  It 
may further delay the election by challenging the 
appropriateness of the bargaining unit.  The longer 
the employer is able to delay the election, the more 
time it has to convince workers that they are better 
off without the union.  In making its case, the 
employer is permitted to disseminate anti-union 
information suggesting that bad things will happen 
if the union is elected.  It may hold captive 
audience meetings in which the negative aspects 
of unionism are highlighted while simultaneously 
prohibiting union organizers from entering the 
premises for the purpose of presenting pro-union 
information.  It may not legally threaten workers 
with dismissal or fire them for supporting a union 
drive, but the Board imposes no penalty for such 
illegal actions.  A worker who is threatened or 
fired for union activity will eventually be 
reinstated, but determining whether the employer 
has acted illegally may take months or years.  In 
the meantime, the worker is without a job. (Yates 
1998: 137).  If the employee decides to return to 
his job following reinstatement, he may be 
punished by the employer for bringing his 
complaints to the Board in the first place and may 
eventually be fired again for his union activity, 
though the employer’s official explanation will be 
that he was fired for something else.  Essentially, 
then, the employer has a host of options at its 
disposal, both legal and illegal, to hinder the 
election process before a single vote is cast.  The 
mere fact that the employer can significantly 
disrupt the process before it has begun may 
convince some workers that organizing will be 
more trouble than it’s worth. 
If the union somehow avoids all these 
obstacles and is successful in holding and winning 
an election, the employer may then hinder the 
collective bargaining process by refusing to 
engage in constructive contract negotiations.  An 
employer’s outright refusal to bargain with the 
union constitutes an unfair labor practice, but it is 
free to be as obstinate as possible during 
negotiations to ensure that no agreement is 
reached on subjects that may be essential to the 
formation of the contract.  By engaging in these 
tactics, particularly while negotiating the first 
contract between the two sides, the employer may 
be successful in destroying the employees’ 
confidence in the newly elected union’s ability to 
operate effectively for its members.  If member 
support begins to erode, the employer may call for 
a decertification election.  If, after all this, the 
employer is unsuccessful in breaking the union, it 
has the option of punishing or firing union 
supporters.  Again, while such tactics clearly 
contravene the NLRA, employees must wait 
months or years for the NLRB to resolve their 
cases.  And even if the employer is found to have 
committed an unfair labor practice, the remedy 
simply entails reinstating the fired employee with 
back pay.  The NLRA provides no mechanism for 
punishing offending employers.   
The multitude of tactics at the employer’s 
disposal to prevent the union from forming or 
successfully achieving gains for its members has 
convinced labor that American labor laws need to 
be changed to put unions on equal footing with 
management.  It has supported an expedited 
NLRB hearing process so that workers who are 
punished or discharged as a result of union activity 
are enumerated or reinstated more quickly.  
Violating employers would be charged with unfair 
labor practices in a more timely fashion so they 
are less willing to continuously violate the law.  
Labor has also focused on lobbying Congress to 
pass legislation imposing substantial financial 
penalties on employers found to have willfully 
violated the NLRA by punishing workers for 
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participating in union activity, hindering the 
election process, or refusing to bargain in good 
faith. 
Labor’s most recent legislative effort, 
introduced in Congress in November 2003 and 
sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) 
and Congressman George Miller (D-Calif.), seeks 
to remedy three key problems.  The Employee 
Free Choice Act would provide for certification of 
a union if the NLRB finds that a majority of 
employees in an appropriate unit has signed 
authorizations designating the union as its 
bargaining representative.  It would ensure that if 
an employer and a union are engaged in 
bargaining for their first contract and are unable to 
reach agreement within 90 days, either party may 
refer the dispute to the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service for mediation.  If the FMCS 
has been unable to bring the parties to agreement 
after 30 days of mediation, the dispute would be 
referred to arbitration and the results of the 
arbitration would be binding on the parties for two 
years.  Finally, it would impose stronger penalties 
on employers for violating the NLRA while 
employees are attempting to organize a union or 
negotiate a first contract.  Specifically, it would 
require the NLRB to seek a federal court 
injunction against an employer whenever there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the employer has 
discharged or discriminated against employees, 
threatened to do so, or engaged in other conduct 
that significantly interferes with employee rights 
during an organizing or first contract drive.  
Additionally, it would increase the amount an 
employer is required to pay when an employee is 
illegally discharged during an organizing 
campaign or first contract drive to triple back pay.  
Civil penalties of up to $20,000 would also be 
imposed on employers found to have willfully or 
repeatedly violated employees’ rights during an 
organizing drive or first contract drive (AFL-CIO 
2004: Employee Free Choice Act). 
Despite the inequities in the law and labor’s 
consistent support for proposed legislation such as 
the Employee Free Choice Act, I argue that 
Congress will not likely enact major labor law 
reform now or in the foreseeable future.  Further, 
even if labor was somehow successful in passing 
meaningful reforms like those proposed in the 
current legislation, it is questionable whether such 
reforms, groundbreaking though they would be, 
would reverse the tide of employer dominance in 
labor-management relations.  Why?  The history 
of labor law reform since 1947 provides insight on 
this question. 
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments, labor strongly condemned them as 
“Slave labor laws” and worked steadfastly for 
their repeal.  When Harry Truman won the 
presidency in 1948 and the Democrats swept both 
houses of Congress, labor concluded that 
conditions were ripe for the extinguishment of 
Taft-Hartley.  Despite the favorable political 
landscape, labor’s absolute insistence on a 
complete repeal of the amendments rather than the 
more moderate set of reforms proposed by 
President Truman proved too much for 
mainstream members of Congress.  As a result, 
Taft-Hartley remained on the books (Hardin 1992: 
46-47).  Aside from the Landrum Griffin Act, 
which addressed corruption in organized labor and 
amended several minor provisions of Taft-Hartley, 
the next major attempt to enact labor law reform 
did not occur until 1978.  The Labor Law Reform 
Bill sought to address several of the most 
egregious inequities in the law by speeding up 
schedules for conducting union representation 
elections and stiffening penalties for employers 
who opposed union organizing by illegal means.  
The law would have required employers to 
compensate illegally discharged employees with 
double back pay and would have barred flagrant 
offenders from receiving government contracts.  
Though the bill had the support of President Carter 
and Democrats controlled both houses of 
Congress, members of the Senate who opposed the 
reforms conducted a five-week filibuster.  After 
six unsuccessful attempts at invoking cloture, the 
legislation was recommitted to the Senate Human 
Resources Committee and died (Hardin 1992: 67-
68). 
Clearly, then, labor has been unsuccessful in 
affecting meaningful labor law reform, even when 
the political climate appears to lean in its favor.  
These failures indicate that even Democrats, long 
said to be the political ally of organized labor, 
have thus far been unwilling to abandon the 
capitalist ideal in favor of a more socially 
progressive labor agenda.  Indeed, as previously 
alluded to, the Democratically controlled Congress 
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of 1948 considered labor’s demands for complete 
repeal of Taft-Hartley too radical to entertain. 
In a 2000 Discussion Paper entitled “Toward a 
New Labor Law,” the Labor Party of America 
concluded that labor’s failure to enact labor law 
reform “will not be reversed with more money, 
better lobbying, or stronger electioneering.  The 
fact is that, absent very extraordinary 
circumstances, business interests hold a veto 
power over labor rights legislation in this country.  
This is because business occupies a ‘privileged 
position’ in our political system.  Public officials 
need cooperation from business, and they cannot 
afford to take it for granted.  In short, government 
leaders can usually afford to stiff unions, but they 
must do what it takes to obtain the cooperation of 
business” (Labor Party 2000: 2). 
The Labor Party’s solution to this problem is 
to circumvent the political process by invoking 
constitutional principles.  It argues that rather than 
engaging in the futile process of trying to pass 
reform legislation, labor should rely on well 
established democratic principles that supersede 
legislation and will never be repealed, namely the 
First Amendment rights of free speech and 
assembly.  It asserts that if these rights were 
properly applied to workplace issues, the 
impediments to organizing, collective bargaining, 
and economic action that currently exist under 
national labor legislation would be swept away by 
the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.  
Workers would be able to form an organization 
without interference by employers, card checks 
and election procedures would be unnecessary 
because the freedom to associate would not 
require them, and employees could freely strike or 
picket their employers without fear of retaliation.  
Further, they could urge other employers’ workers 
to boycott their employer’s goods until it agreed to 
settle their dispute fairly (Labor Party 2000: 2-3).  
This view is shared by a number of international 
labor scholars and used to criticize the American 
system of labor relations. 
In a paper entitled “Choice or Voice?: 
Rethinking American labor policy in light of the 
international human rights consensus”, Dr. Roy 
Adams argues that collective bargaining can 
rightly be viewed as a basic human right rather 
than a privilege conferred on workers by law.  He 
asserts that collective bargaining is consistent with 
the notion of freedom of association, which has 
been recognized as a fundamental human right by 
governments and humanitarian organizations 
around the world, including the International 
Labour Organization, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, and the 
World Trade Organization.  In 1998, the ILO 
published the Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, which lists five 
core rights as fundamental human rights.  They 
are: freedom of association, effective recognition 
of the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of all forms of forced compulsory 
labor, the effective abolition of child labor, the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment or occupation.  Adams suggests that 
the freedom to associate and the attendant right to 
collective bargaining have been universally 
recognized as human rights because of the belief 
that work is a fundamental tenet of human 
existence which should not be subject to 
exploitation and control by those who own the 
means of production.  Consequently, he argues 
that workers have an inalienable right to have a 
voice in determining the terms and conditions of 
their employment, and such a right should not be 
subject to choice.  Adams makes the analogy to a 
nation that has chosen a democratic form of 
government, asserting that once democracy is 
established, “no representation as an option should 
not be given legitimacy.”  Similarly, he argues that 
the right not to engage in collective bargaining 
should not be presented as a viable option.  
Clearly, an individual can make his own decision 
not to participate in a democratic society or not to 
engage in collective bargaining, but once society 
has extended the right to engage in these activities 
and affirmed the value of such rights, it should not 
then encourage people not to exercise them.  
Rather, societal institutions should do all in their 
power to facilitate the free exercise of conferred 
rights, making the process so easy and so common 
that it becomes a normal function of society 
(Adams 2001). 
Defenders of the American system counter 
that collective bargaining need not be considered a 
basic human right because it is not a necessity of 
human existence; thus, people should have the 
freedom to choose whether to bargain collectively 
or individually with their employer.  Furthermore, 
it is argued that freedom of association means 
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having the right to choose not to associate.  If 
individuals are given the right to engage in 
collective bargaining, they should have the 
freedom to choose whether they will exercise that 
right  (Adams 2001). 
Convention 87 of the International Labour 
Organization calls for freedom of association and 
protection of the right to organize.  Convention 98 
establishes principles with respect to the right to 
organize and bargain collectively.  The United 
States is one of the few countries in the world that 
has refused to ratify either convention, which may 
not be surprising given that it is one of the few 
countries that appears not to be in compliance.   
Clearly, the United States would take issue with 
this contention, citing the First Amendment to the 
Constitution and the National Labor Relations Act 
as affirmative examples of its support for the ideas 
contained in the conventions.  There are two 
potential flaws in this line of reasoning.  First, if 
one agrees with Adams’ assertions regarding the 
inalienable right of workers to have a voice in the 
terms and conditions of their employment, the 
right to bargain collectively should not be a 
choice.  Second, even if a worker’s right to choose 
is considered a valid proposition, it can be argued 
that the way in which American courts and the 
National Labor Relations Board have interpreted 
the NLRA leaves workers with very little real 
choice.  That is, because the NLRA has been 
interpreted to favor employers, workers do not see 
collective bargaining as a viable choice and are 
thus deterred from attempting to form or join 
unions.  This inevitably leads them to choose 
individual bargaining as the most effective way to 
achieve optimal gains in the workplace.  As more 
and more people choose individual bargaining, 
those observing trends in union participation 
conclude that people prefer bargaining 
individually rather than collectively and that they 
are consciously exercising their freedom to choose 
and associate.  Having conferred on its people the 
right to choose whether to bargain collectively, it 
is argued that the American system of collective 
bargaining is legitimate and in compliance with 
world standards. 
Assuming that the American system violates 
international labor standards, there are several 
reforms that might help close the gap.  First, the 
United States could implement NLRA reforms 
which have long been proposed by American labor 
advocates, including interim reinstatement of 
discharged workers pending NLRB proceedings, 
increased workplace access for union organizers, 
tougher penalties for unfair labor practices, 
procedures for quicker elections and the efficient 
resolution of election disputes, reversal of the 
permanent-strike breaker doctrine, and first 
contract arbitration.  There are two basic concerns 
with such reforms.  First, while they would 
undoubtedly be welcome changes, evidence 
suggests that they might have minimal effect on 
union participation rates.  Several Canadian 
provinces have enacted reforms such as card check 
certification, quicker election certification votes, 
first contract arbitration, and stiff and rapid 
sanctions against violators of Canadian labor rules.  
No Canadian jurisdiction permits permanent strike 
replacements, and several forbid the employer to 
hire strike replacements at all.  Despite these 
seemingly far-reaching reforms, 8 in 10 Canadian 
workers are non-union.  The union participation 
rate in the U.S. is 9 in 10 without such reforms 
(Adams 2001).  
The second problem with such NLRA 
adjustments is that they would not change the 
American view that workers should be able to 
choose whether to engage in collective bargaining. 
Without addressing the choice issue, collective 
bargaining in the U.S. will continue to fall short of 
international standards. 
Solutions that would more thoroughly address 
the choice issue are reflective of European 
collective bargaining models.  Congress could 
create employee representative councils comprised 
of delegates elected by employees in a particular 
company for the purpose of co-determining, with 
management, a wide range of workplace issues.  In 
Germany, for example, representative councils 
work with management to create workplace policy 
on a wide range of important issues, including 
training, health and safety, the implementation of 
employment legislation, and the implementation of 
collective bargaining agreements negotiated on a 
multi-employer basis by trade unions.  Companies 
may not lay off workers without council consent 
(subject to arbitration), and individual discharges 
may be vetoed by the council (again, subject to 
arbitration) (Adams 2001). 
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Other collective bargaining practices 
commonly found in Europe that could improve 
collective bargaining in the U.S. include placing 
worker representatives on corporate boards, 
implementing a system of national multi-employer 
bargaining, establishing statutorily wage councils 
(run jointly by management and workers) for the 
purpose setting wage policy, and establishing joint 
health and safety committees.  Finally, a 
statutorily prescribed policy of instant recognition 
of collective bargaining units would have a 
significant impact on the issue of choice in the 
American system. 
Because the introduction of these kinds of 
significant changes in collective bargaining policy 
would undoubtedly be resisted at first, the key to 
successful implementation is to promote them in a 
way that makes them an accepted part of the 
collective bargaining system in America, just as 
they are in Europe.  To do this, labor would have 
to abandon its allegiance to the American system 
of labor relations and return to the socially 
progressive agenda that characterized the 
movement in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  But as history has shown, labor 
has suffered its most crushing defeats when it has 
adopted such an agenda; therefore, a return to 
progressivism is unlikely absent extraordinary 
economic circumstances which open the door for 
such change. 
While the AFL-CIO supports the arguments 
advanced by Dr. Adams and has endorsed both the 
International Labor Organization’s Conventions 
calling for freedom of association in the workplace 
and the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, its goal is merely to make 
employers around the world aware of the 
Declaration’s provisions and convince them to 
operate their workplaces in accordance therewith.  
Since there is no practical way to enforce 
democratic principles in the workplace, labor’s 
promotion of the Declaration and other worker 
rights proposals as a response to globalization will 
inevitably be inadequate to meet the needs of 
American workers. 
I have thus far argued that three of labor’s 
primary goals (organizing of 1 million new 
members annually, enacting meaningful labor law 
reform, and softening the effects of globalization 
through the promotion of international worker 
rights) are either unachievable absent an 
extraordinary shift in economic circumstances or, 
if achievable, are unlikely to reverse capital’s 
dominance over workers.  However, many 
scholars disagree with this assessment and have 
predicted the resurgence of labor if certain 
conditions are met.  It is essential, therefore, to 
address the validity of these counter-arguments. 
First, it may be argued that the cataclysmic 
economic event which I deem necessary for 
change is, in fact, upon us.  Indeed, economic 
conditions in America today are eerily similar to 
those which lead to the Great Depression.  As in 
the late 1920s, Americans are working an 
increasing number of hours without experiencing a 
corresponding rise in income.  The disparity 
between rich and poor is growing, with the 
incomes of the wealthiest Americans occupying an 
increasing percentage of the nation’s overall 
wealth.  And falling incomes among the middle 
and lower classes have resulted in diminished 
economic consumption (Wheeler 2002: 26).  Why, 
then, is labor finding it difficult to promote a more 
socially progressive agenda and achieve greater 
parity with capital?  The answer may simply be 
that we haven’t yet experienced the kind of 
economic meltdown that distinguished the 
Depression years.  When three out of ten people 
on the block have lost their jobs and fallen on hard 
economic times, the remaining seven are not 
prepared to rebel against a social and economic 
system that has historically produced favorable 
results.  When everyone on the block is out of 
work, they all have no alternative but to reexamine 
the wisdom of the system that has brought them 
their current circumstances.    
Notwithstanding a second Great Depression, 
what if labor could somehow overcome the 
tremendous obstacles to enacting labor law reform 
and create a system with automatic card check 
certification, first contract arbitration, a ban on 
permanent strike replacements, and stiffer 
penalties for labor law violators?  Labor strongly 
argues that such changes in the law would enable 
it to achieve relative parity with capital and 
establish an environment conducive to workplace 
democracy and worker rights.  However, as 
previously noted, the enactment of many of these 
policies in Canada has only slightly increased 
union participation rates.  This may indicate that 
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greater government intervention, while certainly 
helpful in balancing inequities in labor-
management relations, cannot completely nullify 
the debilitating effect of strong employer 
opposition.  It may be that government 
intervention is only truly effective where 
employers have come to accept unions as part of 
the economic environment. 
If these assumptions about employer 
opposition are correct, what if the American 
system of labor relations could be modified to 
reflect those found in Europe?  In Sweden, for 
example, government has ensured full 
employment through progressive taxation while 
statutorily regulating many aspects of the labor-
management relationship.  Government regulation 
has provided workers with protection against 
arbitrary dismissal, accidents and illness at work 
(through health and safety regulations), and 
declining wages (through a standardized minimum 
wage, wage indexation, social security benefits, 
etc.).  It also plays a vital role in the collective 
bargaining process by regulating the terms and 
conditions through which unions and management 
negotiate employment agreements.  Government 
involvement in the bargaining process essentially 
provides workers with greater protection against 
potential domination at the hands of employers.  
These additional protections for workers create a 
level of socio-economic equality foreign to free 
market economies.  In exchange, the government 
allows management broad discretion to manage 
their businesses as they see fit, and the private 
ownership of capital is largely preserved (Gray 
1998: 167). 
 In Germany, the market economy is 
characterized by a comprehensive welfare state 
and a business structure in which workers 
participate in deciding how the workplace with 
operate.  Such a business model creates greater 
equality among workers and employers than exists 
in the United States.  There is also industry-wide 
collective bargaining over wages, benefits, and 
conditions of employment, and a high degree of 
job security, both of which are secured through 
national legislation.  When German workers lose 
their jobs, the government pays them about two-
thirds of their incomes in unemployment benefits.  
Furthermore, the value of human labor is not 
measured solely in terms of productivity.  Indeed, 
the slash and burn mentality so prevalent in the 
American economy is subordinate to the theory 
that peoples’ value as employees extends beyond 
the amount they produce on a daily basis.  The 
chairman of the Siemens Corporation, one of the 
world’s premier electronics companies, has 
reportedly stated that “the hire and fire principle 
does not exist here, and I never want it to.” (Gray 
1998: 169).  
The most obvious problem associated with 
implementing these kinds of labor relations 
systems is that they are socialist.  As Thomas 
Geoghegan notes in “Which Side Are You On”, 
“the whole thrust of organized labor is….well, not 
socialism” (Geoghegan 1992: 6).  History shows 
that labor’s previous attempts to overthrow 
capitalism and replace it with a socially 
progressive economic system have ended in 
disaster.  Consequently, asking whether the 
American system can be modified to look more 
like a European-style social democracy appears 
futile.  However, if such a revolution were to 
occur, organized labor in the United States would 
most likely experience a level of strength similar 
to unions in Europe, and its goals of increasing 
worker participation and strengthening worker 
rights would largely be realized.  Again, the 
primary reason for such success would be the 
absence of employer opposition. 
In terms of organizing new members, what if 
unions could successfully offset the devastating 
membership losses it has suffered in the industrial 
sector by organizing the burgeoning class of white 
collar and service sector workers?  Would that 
spur labor’s revival?  White collar workers have 
traditionally been more difficult to organize 
because they have tended to view their interests 
and abilities as being different from those of blue 
collar workers.  They have traditionally identified 
themselves more with managers because they are 
generally better educated and believe their 
superior skill sets will enable them to rise to the 
ranks of management or negotiate effectively with 
management for what they want.  That perception 
has been gradually eroded by increasingly limited 
opportunities for advancement among white collar 
workers and the outsourcing of these jobs to 
cheaper labor markets.  As a result, white collar 
workers are now more likely to identify with 
traditional blue collar issues such as promotional 
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opportunities and job security, and thus may be an 
ideal organizing target. (Wheeler 2002: 73)  Still, 
their organizing preferences tend to differ from 
those of blue collar workers.  Their emphasis on 
individualized rewards and promotions leads them 
to form unions that: 1. bargain only for minimum 
wage levels, leaving room for individual 
bargaining for wages above these levels, 2. 
encourage other forms of participation along with 
bargaining, 3. downplay seniority and put more 
emphasis on merit, 4. rarely seek finely specified 
work rules, 5. minimize the strike in favor of 
publicity and lobbying, and 6. are relatively 
decentralized (Wheeler 2002: 58).  The practices 
typical of these “associational” unions are 
consistent with the organizational preferences 
identified by Freeman and Rogers in that they 
emphasize individualism, cooperation, and 
decentralization. This presents two problems for 
unions.  First, unions would have to completely 
reinvent themselves by relinquishing control over 
most aspects of the collective bargaining process.  
If they agreed to abide by the above principles, 
they would no longer have the power to bargain 
for premium wages, seniority, or specific work 
rules.  They would be forced to abandon the 
collective bargaining process completely 
whenever the members decide to bargain 
individually and would be able to call a strike only 
as a last resort.  Given the workers’ preference for 
individual action and the union’s limited ability to 
act on behalf of the members, workers might well 
question the wisdom of having a union at all.  And 
they would certainly question the wisdom of 
paying union dues for so little benefit.  As the 
Freeman/ Rogers survey indicates, workers in this 
situation might decide that they can just as 
effectively engage in occasional collective action 
without the formality of a union. 
The second potential problem with organizing 
private sector professional employees on a large 
scale is that it would most likely require changes 
to the NLRA’s rules regarding subjects of 
bargaining.  Section 9(a) of the Act provides that 
representatives designated or selected by the 
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall 
be the exclusive representative “for the purpose of 
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, 
wages, hours, or other conditions of employment.”  
The NLRB and the Supreme Court have 
subsequently used this language to establish a 
distinction between mandatory and permissive 
subjects of bargaining (Hardin 1992: 595).  It is 
argued that the failure of the NLRA to require 
bargaining on permissive subjects such as the 
basic policies of work organization makes it ill-
suited to collective bargaining for professional 
employees because it is those subjects with which 
professional employees are most concerned.  
Additionally, the Act’s rules establishing the union 
as the exclusive representative of all employees 
runs counter to the preference of many workers to 
bargain individually and create informal collective 
bargaining arrangements as necessary (Wheeler 
2002: 74). 
A similar argument is made with regard to 
“geographical/occupational unionism“, which 
involves organizing workers along occupational 
lines regardless of their geographic location.  
While such an organizational tactic allows unions 
to expand the scope of their organizing campaign 
and attract new members, the NLRA limits 
“network-based” or “multiemployer” bargaining.  
For this to be a viable organizing alternative, the 
Act would have to be changed to permit 
employees of different employers to bargain 
jointly with those employers (Wheeler 2002: 52).  
Given the difficulties labor has encountered trying 
to amend the NLRA, such change is unlikely. 
CONCLUSION 
“Labor thinks of itself, consciously, as being 
as American as apple pie.  But it is not.  Go to any 
union hall, any union rally, and listen to the 
speeches.  It took me years to hear it, but there is a 
silence, a deafening silence, on the subject of 
individualism.  No one is against it, but it never 
comes up.  Individualism is for scabs.  This 
country is set up for scabs.  Crossing a picket line, 
making your own deal.  America is the land of 
opportunity.  The subversive thing about labor is 
not the strike, but the idea of solidarity.” 
(Geoghegan 1992: 5).  Thomas Geoghegan thus 
encapsulates the premise of this paper.  I have 
argued that individualism will always prevail over 
the social progressivism embodied by the 
American labor movement.  The latter is rooted in 
the idea that “an injury to one is an injury to all”, 
but in America, it is simply more appealing to 
believe that each of us has the ability to get what 
we want on our own and that, once we get it, we 
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shouldn’t have to share it with anyone.  The 
history of the labor movement shows that any 
attempt to replace capitalism with social 
democracy will be met with defeat, even when the 
very foundations on which capitalism is based 
have collapsed.  Consequently, the most viable 
solution to the problem of employer domination 
may be a return to the idea of worker cooperatives 
advanced by the Knights of Labor.  If workers are 
able to assume ownership of the means of 
production, they are no longer in opposition to 
management because they are management.  
However, in a system where some are employers 
and others are employees, the best labor can do is 
to continue advocating for the right of workers to 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives at 
work and to promote a more equitable society.  In 
ordinary economic times, it is not likely to fully 
achieve these goals by organizing new members or 
electing pro-labor politicians or supporting 
fundamental workplace rights abroad, although it 
must try.  In extraordinarily hard economic times, 
it must take advantage of its elevated position in 
society to establish basic workplace rights that 
cannot be taken away, even when the economy 
recovers and labor is once again relegated to 
underdog status.  The minimum wage, the eight 
hour day, unemployment insurance, and 
workplace health and safety laws are proof that 
labor has the ability, under certain circumstances, 
to strengthen workers’ rights.  As Geoghegan 
notes, “A union movement in America will always 
be a scandal.  But, at the very least, we want to be 
cut in on the deal” (Geoghegan 1992: 6).  If labor 
cannot successfully change the system, it must do 
what it can to be “cut in on the deal.” 
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